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The success of crowdsourcing markets is dependent on a
strong foundation of trust between workers and requesters.
In current marketplaces, workers and requesters are often
unable to trust each other’s quality, and their mental models
of tasks are misaligned due to ambiguous instructions or
confusing edge cases. This breakdown of trust typically
arises from (1) flawed reputation systems which do not
accurately reflect worker and requester quality, and from
(2) poorly designed tasks. In this demo, we present how
Boomerang and Prototype Tasks, the fundamental build-
ing blocks of the Daemo crowdsourcing marketplace, help
restore trust between workers and requesters. Daemo’s
Boomerang reputation system incentivizes alignment be-
tween opinion and ratings by determining the likelihood
that workers and requesters will work together in the fu-
ture based on how they rate each other. Daemo’s Proto-
type tasks require that new tasks go through a feedback
iteration phase with a small number of workers so that re-





H.5.3. [Group and Organization Interfaces]
Introduction
Crowdsourcing markets such as Amazon Mechanical Turk
and Upwork function optimally when trust exists between
workers and requesters. Requesters come expecting that
workers will quickly produce high-quality results, and work-
ers expect that their hard work will be rewarded fairly [6].
However, requesters are often surprised by low-quality re-
sults [5]—as a result, they rerun tasks, discard collected
data, and deploy complex worker filters. Conversely, work-
ers are surprised to receive negative feedback or no pay for
their hard work. This produces a downward spiral whereby
workers feel justified in producing lower quality work and
requesters drive down wages, producing a “market for
lemons” [4]. Unfortunately, without the ability to change the
mechanics of the platform, most research today focuses on
downstream solutions that minimize the damage done.
We will demonstrate the Daemo crowdsourcing market-
place, and in particular how Boomerang [2] and Prototype
tasks [1], two of its fundamental building blocks, help create
feedback loops to address trust breakdowns early and up-
stream, before they cascade and amplify in effect. Daemo
focuses on two instances in the task lifecycle when trust is
especially vulnerable.
The first instance is when a task is on the marketplace,
waiting for workers to accept it. In this state, both workers
and requesters must rely on reputation scores such as ac-
ceptance rates or star ratings to make a decision whether
to accept the work. However, these reputation scores are
often significantly inflated due to social pressure [3]. The
result is that a worker or requester may agree to work with
a highly-rated partner, only to find out that the partner is, in
fact, fairly mediocre.
The second vulnerable moment is when workers execute
the task. In this state, workers must build a mental model of
Figure 1: Daemo’s task feed lists all available tasks, their prices,
and reputation of the requester.
what the requester wants. However, requesters are domain
experts and not designers, leading them to believe that their
task authorship is high-quality when it may in fact be quite
the opposite, assuming tacit knowledge and ignoring edge
cases [6]. When this occurs, even hard work may result in
rejections because workers and requesters had no chance
to reach a shared mental model.
First, addressing the breakdown in reputation, Daemo lever-
ages Boomerang, a reputation system that differs from tra-
ditional rate-and-leave systems by “boomerang-ing” the
accuracy of the rating decision back to directly impact the
user [2]. This feedback loop means that giving someone
a high rating increases the likelihood of working with that
individual again, while giving a low rating reduces that like-
lihood. First, requester ratings determine early access to
tasks. If a requester rates a worker highly, for example, that
worker gets early access to the requester’s tasks. Rating
a mediocre worker highly means that worker is likely to re-
turn and perform (mediocre) work for that requester again.
Second, worker ratings determine the ranking of the list of
tasks available to them (the task feed). If a worker rates a
requester highly, that requester’s tasks will be ranked at the
top of their task feed. Rating a mediocre requester highly
will add (mediocre) tasks to the top of the feed and make it
difficult to find work. This approach aims to align reputation
more with true opinion, reducing the chances that a user is
surprised to find a high-rated worker or requester who is of
poor quality [2].
Current State of Daemo
We are building up demand to
make Daemo a vibrant
platform.
Requester Side: On the
requester side, Daemo has






crowdworkers on a set of
Wikipedia articles.
Worker Side: On the worker
side, we are optimistic: many
workers from Mechanical Turk,
Upwork, etc., are part of our
collective and act as a seed
crowd of workers for Daemo.
Second, addressing the breakdown in task authorship,
Daemo leverages prototype tasks, requiring that tasks go
through iteration driven by feedback from workers before
launching to the marketplace [1]. Inspired by best practice
in the user-centered design process [7], prototype tasks pay
3–5 workers to complete a small percentage of the over-
all work and provide feedback on how to improve the task
interface or clarify it. Requesters use the feedback, and
any differences between their expected results and the pro-
totype task results, to iterate. They identify unanticipated
edge cases, clarify instructions and iterate before launching
to the general platform. In doing so, requesters increase the
probability that their tasks deliver the desired mental model
and thus produce work that matches the requester’s expec-
tations.
Years ago, the Web was a morass of information, with mediocre
and high-quality sources mixed in every search query re-
sult. The main advance of search engines’ authority and
centrality metrics was to increase users’ trust in the results
they saw, to the point that we now trust search engines to
make the world’s information readily accessible. Daemo is
built by a worldwide group of workers, requesters, and re-
searchers [1]. It represents an attempt to make collective
intelligence as readily accessible as search engines made
our information.
Figure 2: Daemo’s drag-and-drop task authoring interface
includes a library of interactive controls that allows requesters to
design prototype tasks.
Daemo
Daemo’s main page for workers is a task feed that lists all
available tasks, their prices, and reputation of the requester.
The feed lists all tasks that the worker has a sufficiently
high reputation score to complete. Workers browse this
feed to pick tasks and claim them(Figure 1). They com-
plete the tasks, optionally rate the requester on a X-, X,
X+ scale, and submit the work to the requester. When the
work is accepted, they receive payment.
Requesters post prototype tasks using the Daemo inter-
face. They upload a comma-separated value (CSV) file with
any inputs that the task requires, and use a task builder to
create the task interface (Figure 2). Requesters estimate
the length of time that the task takes, which helps price the
task. When ready, requesters post the task and monitor
progress. Once work is submitted, requesters can choose
to Accept each task, Return the task for revision, or (in ex-
ceptional cases, and after revision has failed) Reject the
work. They can likewise rate workers on a X-, X, X+ scale.
Evaluation and Market Governance
To gather evidence for whether our technical approaches
(Boomerang and Prototype tasks) help establish trust, we
have run field experiments with workers and requesters.
So far, evidence suggests that Boomerang successfully de-
flates reputation ratings and produces scores that are con-
sistent with workers’ and requesters’ private opinions [2].
Likewise, requesters reported that task results are signifi-
cantly better with the use of prototype tasks.
Our approach to all these challenges—technical, research,
and policy—is highly iterative through collaboration with
the crowdsourcing community. We are currently collectively
designing an open governance structure and constitution
for Daemo that brings all the constituent parties—worker,
requester and platform—into the administration, thereby
facilitating a greater level of representation in the system.
As a first step toward building a self-governing community,
we have drawn inspiration from historical worker guilds to
design and implement crowd guilds: centralized groups of
crowd workers who collectively certify each other’s quality
through double-blind peer assessment and participate in an
integrated forum [8].
Conclusion
Daemo is a crowdsourcing marketplace that attempts to
improve trust in crowdsourcing through upstream fixes.
Our goal is to develop a strong community that balances
power amongst workers, requesters, and researchers, and
to demonstrate the opportunity to grow a crowdsourcing
platform that does not succumb to the market for lemons.
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